Optimal Antitrust Penalties and Competitors\u27 Injury by Page, William H.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 88 Issue 7 
1990 
Optimal Antitrust Penalties and Competitors' Injury 
William H. Page 
Mississippi College School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons 
Recommended Citation 
William H. Page, Optimal Antitrust Penalties and Competitors' Injury, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2151 (1990). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol88/iss7/5 
 
This Correspondence is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of 
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an 
authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please 
contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
CORRESPONDENCE 
Optimal Antitrust Penalties and Competitors' Injury 
William H. Page* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Herbert Hovenkamp's primary target in Antitrust's Protected 
Classes 1 is the Chicago School's optimal deterrence model of antitrust 
penalties.2 Substantive antitrust rules are often overinclusive -
prohibiting practices even when they are efficient - in order to avoid 
the costs of error associated with a more case-specific rule. 3 The opti-
mal deterrence model attempts to correct for this overinclusiveness by 
setting the penalty for antitrust violations at a level just sufficient to 
deter only inefficient instances of the violation.4 The task is compli-
cated by, among other things, the myriad effects antitrust offenses can 
have on economic actors: allocative inefficiencies and efficiencies (the 
losses and gains, respectively, in value to consumers from reduced or 
increased output of a product); productive inefficiencies and efficien-
cies (cost increases or cost savings in production of a product); and 
wealth transfers from one economic actor to another. William Landes 
distills the analysis into a formula: the penalty should be equal to the 
net harm to everyone but the offender. 5 For cartels, the optimal pen-
alty would be equal to the deadweight welfare loss plus the wealth 
transfer to the cartel from purchasers; this penalty would deter only 
those instances of the offense in which the deadweight welfare loss 
exceeded any savings in production costs to the cartel. 
Hovenkamp contends that the model understates the welfare losses 
• Professor, Mississippi College School of Law. B.A. 1973, Tulane University; J.D. 1975, 
University of New Mexico; LL.M. 1979, University of Chicago.-Ed. I would like to thank Ian 
Ayres, Roger Blair, Craig Callen, Einer Elhauge, and John Lopatka for their comments. 
1. Hovenkamp, Antitrust's Protected Classes, 88 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1989). 
2. See Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 652 (1983). 
For development, see Page, The Chicago School and the Evolution of Antitrust: Characterization, 
Antitrust Injury, and Evidentiary Sufficiency, 75 VA. L. REv. 1221 (1989) [hereinafter Page, Chi-
cago School]; Page, The Scope of Liability for Antitrust Violations, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1445 (1985) 
[hereinafter Page, Scope of Liability]; Page, Antitrust Damages and Economic Efficiency: An 
Approach to Antitrust Injury, 47 U. CHI. L. REv. 467 (1980) [hereinafter Page, Antitrust 
Damages]. 
3. See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Socy., 457 U.S. 332, 343-44 (1982). 
4. Landes, supra note 2, at 654-56. 
5. Id. at 656. 
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associated with monopolistic practices by ignoring costs imposed on 
competitors of the offender - what he calls WL3 (welfare loss three) 
losses. 6 These, he argues, are a social cost of monopoly in addition to 
the conventional deadweight loss in value from the monopolistic out-
put restriction (WLJ losses), and even in addition to the costs of rent-
seeking that Richard Posner7 and others have suggested approximate 
another cost of monopoly (WL2 losses). This failure to recognize 
WL3 losses, Hovenkamp argues, has led Chicago School commenta-
tors to set undue restrictions on the private damage action. Frank 
Easterbrook, for example, has contended that competitors should 
never have the right to sue for antitrust harms. 8 Hovenkamp attempts 
to refute Easterbrook by showing that these injuries constitute a social 
cost;9 that Congress originally intended both to protect competitors 
6. Hovenkamp, supra note 1, at 17-20. Hovenkamp uses the following diagram: 
WL3 
FIGURE ONE 
The competitive price and output are Pc and Qc respectively. The monopoly price and out-
put are the higher Pm and the lower Qm. As a result of the reduced output from monopoly, 
consumers lose in surplus value an amount equal to the area WLJ, the amount by which their 
valuation of the lost output (the area under D between Qc - Qm) exceeds the cost of production. 
They also pay more for the remaining units of output: the area WL2 reflects the wealth trans-
ferred from consumers to the monopolist as a result of the overcharge. Posner and others have 
argued that this amount approximates the costs of rent-seeking that the monopolist and others 
incur in trying to achieve monopoly - another welfare loss. See infra note 7. 
According to Hovenkarnp, the area WL3 represents an additional welfare loss to consumers: 
the harm to competitors imposed by the would-be monopolist's rent-seeking efforts. 
7. See, e.g., Posner, The Social Cost of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. PoL. EcoN. 807 
(1975). 
8. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 331 
(1981). 
9. Hovenkarnp, supra note 1, at 17-20, 32-33. 
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and to provide them with a remedy; 10 and that competitors are "often 
the most efficient enforcers of the antitrust laws, for they are in a posi-
tion to catch monopolistic activity much earlier than are 
consumers. " 11 
Hovenkamp makes a worthwhile contribution to the "new learn-
ing" on the private antitrust remedy, 12 the effort to reconcile private 
treble damage and injunction actions with the economic goa1s of anti-
trust. He is right to emphasize the centrality of harm to competitors 
in our present system of private antitrust enforcement. In my view, 
however, his notion of WL3 losses and the related characterization of 
competitors as a "protected class" are unnecessary and potentially 
misleading as criteria for defining compensable antitrust harms. 
Since the Sylvania decision, 13 courts have increasingly turned to 
economic models - particularly those of the Chicago School - to 
separate monopolistic from competitive harms.14 By formalizing the 
effects of antitrust practices on efficiency and on the wealth of various 
economic actors, the models guide the formulation of substantive 
rules, the application of rules to particular practices, and the definition 
of compensable harms. Hovenkamp's notion of WL3 losses offers no 
such guidance. In the next Part, I argue that the concept of WL3 
losses misconceives the socia1 costs of monopolistic exclusion and fails 
to provide a theoretical link between the competitor's harm and the 
monopolistic outpµt restriction. In Part III, I argue that competitors' 
harms should in some instances be compensable as antitrust damages 
- not because they represent social costs in themselves, but because 
they can be proxies for the demonstrable costs of monopoly. Competi-
tors are not, I argue, a protected class; their right to recover is purely 
instrumental to the ultimate standard of consumer welfare. 
II. WELFARE LOSSES AND COMPETITIVE HARM 
Theories are supposed to show causal relationships. In the con-
ventional model of monopoly, for example, the output restriction 
causes the deadweight welfare loss and the monopoly overcharge. The 
theory allows us to see a host of critical relationships, such as the link 
10. Id. at 27-30. 
11. Id. at 31. The same point is made in Spiller, Comments on Easterbrook and Snyder, 28 
J.L. & EcoN. 489 (1985). 
12. See Breit & Elzinga, Private Antitrust Enforcement: The New Leaming, 28 J.L. & EcoN. 
405 (1985). 
13. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
14. See generally Page, Chicago School supra note 2. 
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between elasticity of demand and monopoly power.15 These kinds of 
causal relations are crucial in the analysis of the welfare effects of mo-
nopoly. Hovenkamp offers no comparable theory to support the no-
tion of WL3 losses. In particular, he provides no account of the causal 
relationship between competitive harms and the monopolistic output 
restriction. 
Significantly, Hovenkamp is unable to formalize his concept other 
than by drawing a mysterious box next to the conventional compara-
tive static model of the effects of monopoly. 16 But there is no apparent 
reason why it could not as plausibly be drawn next to a model of per-
fect competition.17 Hovenkamp says his notion of WL3 losses is "not 
captured by the [market] demand curve itself. Its definition, existence, 
or size is not clearly rela~ed to any of the cost or revenue functions 
ordinarily included in the demand curve."18 Without causal connec-
tions, there is no way to set limits of any kind on the size of the box. 
Existing as it does outside the demand curve - beyond the pale, one 
might say - there is no upper bound to its size. As Hovenkamp rec-
ognizes, the size of the WL3 losses is "potentially unlimited."19 It is 
not necessary, in his view, that there be any monopoly before WL3 
losses can occur. "WL3 losses occur while the monopolist or aspiring 
monopolist is taking the anticompetitive actions that it hopes will cre-
ate or protect its monopoly."20 
Hovenkamp apparently does not mean by all this to suggest that 
all harms to competitors are costs of monopoly. He recognizes, for 
example, that "[t]he fact that an efficient plant was forced to close or 
that a potentially successful product was kept off the market is part of 
the social cost of monopoly only if the person responsible did it in 
order to attain or retain a monopoly position."21 But this reference to 
15. See, e.g., R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN EcONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 247 (1976); 
Landes & Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937 (1981). 
16. See supra note 6. 
17. Similar problems, of course, attend the notion of WL2 losses suggested by Posner, supra 
note 7, and summarized (and apparently accepted) by Hovenkamp, supra note 1, at 15· 16. The 
idea here is that the wealth transfer to producers is not normatively neutral, as traditional econo-
mists have contended, since it attracts resources toward getting those profits. These expenditures 
on "rent-seeking" are wasted, and approximate a welfare loss from monopoly in addition to the 
traditional deadweight loss, dubbed WLI by Hovenkamp. The difficulty with this position, 
which very few Chicagoans accept without qualification, is that resources expended in hopes of 
getting a monopoly are not necessarily (or even probably) entirely wasted - they are quite likely 
to reflect expenditures on advertising and product enhancement that provide benefits to consum· 
ers. Thus, WL2 very likely overstates the welfare loss from monopoly. 
18. Hovenkamp, supra note 1, at 18. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. at 32. 
21. Id. at 21. 
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monopolistic intent is all we get on the critical question of causation. 
The traditional tools of economic analysis show the shortcomings 
of Hovenkamp's approach. They can illustrate, for example, more 
pertinent instances than WL3 losses of costs borne by competitors of 
the offender that are also social costs. Consider, for example, the 
model of pricing by a firm (or cartel) that acquires a dominant market 
share, but must nonetheless share the market with a fringe of competi-
tive firms.22 In that model, the monopolistic output restriction not 
only causes a deadweight welfare loss and a wealth transfer to the 
dominant firm, but also creates a price umbrella over competitive 
fringe firms. Those firms therefore increase production to the point at 
22. Consider the following diagram, adapted from Page, Scope of Liability, supra note 2, at 
1466, and Note, Standing at the Fringe: Antitrust Damage and the Fringe Producer, 35 STAN. L. 





Qf' Qd Qm' Qc Q 
FIGURE 2 
In this model, a cartel or dominant firm with marginal cost MCd is created in a market with 
demand XD, but must share the market with a competitive fringe firm with marginal cost MC/: 
The cartel maximizes profit by subtracting the fringe firm's output from the market demand, and 
acting as a monopolist with respect to the remainder. It thus constructs a residual demand curve 
X'C and marginal revenue curve X'B. It then sets output at Qd where X'B = MCd, giving a 
price of Pm: The fringe firm is competitive, and so takes Pm' as given, setting output where Pm' 
= MC/: The cartel receives a monopoly profit equal to the area A 'B'F'E~ the fringe firm re-
ceives the area E'Pm 'Pc as a rent. 
Now compare this equilibrium. with the competitive price (Pc) and output (Qc). The lower 
output and higher price causes a deadweight welfare loss of A'CB: In addition, the increased 
production of the less efficient fringe causes an increase in production costs of E'F'Pc. This 
productive inefficiency is a social cost of the dominant firm pricing in addition to the deadweight 
welfare loss. 
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which their marginal cost equals the dominant firm price - much as 
Mexico follows the OPEC price. Since, before the formation of the 
cartel, all firms were equally efficient at the margin, the reallocation of 
output to the fringe firms reduces productive efficiency. 
The increased production costs of the fringe are a recognizable so-
cial cost of dominant firm pricing that are neither WLJ nor WL2 
losses. But they cannot be WL3 losses either. Although they reflect 
increased costs of competitors' production, they manifestly do not 
harm the fringe competitors, because the overcharge that the price 
umbrella imposes on consumers fully covers the competitors' costs. 
Hovenkamp uses WL3 losses primarily to describe the harms that 
exclusionary practices impose on competitors. But the dominant firm 
model helps us understand the effects of these practices as well. Sup-
pose the dominant firm in the previous example were able to exclude 
the fringe firm. The exclusion would certainly harm the fringe firm. 
Would that harm be a social cost? Not if the dominant firm's means 
of exclusion were simply to set a competitive price and output:23 that 
would eliminate the deadweight welfare loss and the productive ineffi-
ciency of dominant firm pricing. The harm to the fringe firm would 
thus be a wealth transfer to consumers, and permit a net savings in 
production costs and an increase in allocative efficiency. 
Suppose, however, that the dominant firm were able costlessly24 to 
exclude the fringe firm and then to set a pure monopoly price and 
output. Such an action would clearly be anticompetitive, even though 
it eliminated a competitor that was less efficient on average than the 
dominant firm. The fringe firm's production limits the monopoly 
power of the dominant firm. Were that production eliminated, the 
dominant firm would become a monopolist. The deadweight welfare 
loss under pure monopoly is demonstrably greater, ceteris paribus, 
than the sum of the deadweight loss and the productive inefficiency 
associated with dominant firm pricing.25 
23. This was apparently the strategy of Alcoa in the classic monopolization case, United 
States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 431 (2d Cir. 1945). 
24. The assumption of costless exclusion is, of course, unrealistic; the would-be predator 
must incur some costs to impose them on competitors. It is possible, however, that the costs to 
the predator will be less than the costs imposed on the victim, making the practice profitable to 
the predator. I have ignored these costs in order to focus more clearly on the welfare effects of 
the harm to the competitors. 
25. In the diagram in note 22, supra, if the cartel were able to exclude the fringe firm, it 
would become a pure monopolist, setting output where the marginal revenue curve XB drawn to 
the market demand curve XD equals MCd, and setting a price of Pm. Output in the market 
would fall from Qm' to Qd, a decrease equal to Qf~ the fringe firm's output. The deadweight 
welfare loss would increase by the shaded area A 'B'BA. The production costs E'F'Pc would be 
saved, but since the output restriction Qm' - Qd is equal to the fringe firm's lost output QJ: the 
increase in allocative inefficiency exceeds the savings in production costs by 1/2 the area of 
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Notice, however, that the cost imposed on the fringe firm itself is 
not an additional social cost of exclusion, as Hovenkamp suggests, but 
is already accounted for in the foregoing welfare analysis. The fringe 
firm loses the stream of rents it would have garnered from pricing 
under the dominant firm's umbrella. But its fixed costs have already 
been incurred; they are bygones, not an additional cost of the monopo-
listic practice. Moreover, if the firm's output drops to zero, its varia-
ble costs are actually saved by the exclusionary practice. The true 
welfare loss from the monopolistic practice is the lost value associated 
with the units of output that the fringe firm would have produced, 
minus the savings in production costs. 
The fringe firm's assets may decline in value; perhaps this decline 
is what Hovenkamp means by WL3 losses. But the reduction in the 
assets' value is simply a measure of their special profitability in the 
dominant firm's market. This amount reflects the fringe firm's lost 
stream of rents. The social cost is accounted for in the reduction in 
allocative inefficiency from the exclusion. The real concern in this 
type of exclusionary practice thus lies in the increased monopoly 
power of the dominant firm. 
What about the costs imposed on competitors during a predatory 
campaign,, before the competitors are actually excluded? Hovenkamp 
suggests that such costs are social costs if the offender has a monopo-
liStic motive. Here it is important to distinguish different forms of 
predation. If the means of exclusion is predatory pricing, then - con-
trary to Hovenkamp's assertion26 - the harm to the competitor is 
demonstrably not a social cost. The competitor suffers losses, cer-
tainly, but they are the result of reduced revenues, not increased pro-
duction costs. These losses are wealth transfers to consumers, who 
A'B'BG' plus the area of AA'G~ Stated another way, the increase in allocative inefficiency is 
equal to Qf'(Pm' - Pc) + Q/'12 (Pm - Pm') and the savings in production costs is equal to 
Qf'/2 (Pm' - Pc). Substituting, we can see that the allocative inefficiency is equal to twice the 
savings in production costs, plus Q/'/2 (Pm - Pm'). 
Note that in this example, since MCd intersects XB and X'B at the same point B, the domi-
nant firm's output does not change with the exclusion of the fringe firm. If MCd intersected XB 
and X'B at points above B, the dominant firm's output would increase with the exclusion of the 
fringe; if MCd intersected XB and X'B at points below B, the dominant firm's output would 
decrease with the exclusion. In both cases, however, the reduction in allocative efficiency would 
outweigh any cost savings. 
26. Hovenkamp, supra note l, at 34-35. 
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benefit from the lower prices.27 The only welfare loss associated with 
predatory pricing during the predatory campaign is the increase in 
production beyond the level at which consumers are willing to pay the 
marginal cost of producing the good; that cost, however, is borne en-
tirely by the predator, which must produce the marginal units. The 
victim need not increase production and may, in fact, minimize its 
losses by decreasing production. 
Even if the predatory campaign takes the form of raising rivals' 
costs,28 the losses to competitors are not themselves the defining social 
cost of the practice. Raising rivals' costs is monopolistic because it 
reduces the supply elasticity of the fringe firms, thereby increasing the 
27. See Page, Antitrust Damages, supra note 2, at 483-84. 
Qf Qm Qc Qp Q 
FIGURE 3 
In this diagram, the predator sets a price of Pp, below its marginal cost MC in hopes of 
driving out a competitor with output QI and recouping its losses by setting a monopoly price of 
Pm. To do this, the predator must increase output to Qp, suffering losses equal to the difference 
between MC and Pp on all units of output. The victim also suffers losses on its units of output, 
but these are from reduced revenues, not from increased costs. They are a wealth transfer to 
consumers. The only social cost during the predatory campaign is the shaded area below MC, 
the excess costs from producing units that consumers value less than their cost of production. 
That cost is borne by the predator. 
28. See Hovenkarnp, supra note I, at 18-20. On raising rivals' costs as a competitive strat-
egy, see Krattenmaker & Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achie~·e 
Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209 (1986). But see Liebeler, What Are the Alternatives to Chi-
cago?, 1987 DUKE L.J. 879, 894. 
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monopoly power of the predator.29 Suppose, for example, the 
predator is able to deny the victim access to an economy of scale, and 
thus is able to increase the victim's marginal cost.30 The victim's out-
put declines as its marginal cost increases; the predator's output may 
increase,31 but by an amount less than the victim's reduction in out-







D o ......................................................... .... 
Qf" Qf' Qd Qin" Qin' 
F'IGURE4 
Qc Q 
The diagram is similar to the one in note 22, in that it shows the effect of a fringe firm's 
output on the profit maximizing price and output of a dominant firm. It differs from the earlier 
diagram in that it compares those effects under two possible fringe firm supply functions, MC/' 
and MCj': Suppose the fringe firm's supply curve is MC/: The dominant firm maximizes profit 
by constructing a residual demand curve X'C with the marginal revenue curve X'B drawn to it. 
It then equates marginal revenue with its marginal cost MCd at output Qd, and sets the corre-
sponding price of Pm: The fringe firm sets its marginal cost equal to Pm' at an output of QI: 
and the market's output (QI'+ Qd) is Qm: The deadweight loss here isA'CB' and the monop-
oly profit to the dominant firm is A 'B'F'E: The fringe firm's production costs exceed the domi-
nant firm's cost for those units by an amount equal to the area of E'F'Pc. 
Now suppose the dominant firm is able (costlessly to itself) to increase the marginal cost of 
the fringe firm. The fringe firm's supply elasticity decreases as its marginal cost shifts up to 
MC/': Now the dominant firm is able to construct a Jess elastic residual demand curve X"C and 
corresponding marginal revenue curve X''B. The resulting profit-maximizing price, Pm': is 
higher, and the attendant market output Qm" is lower. The fringe firm now takes the higher 
price, but with higher marginal costs and lower output QI': 
30. Hovenkamp uses the examples of Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 
U.S. 492 (1988), and American Socy. of Mech. Engrs. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556 (1982). 
Hovenkamp, supra note 1, at 19. 
31. In the diagram in note 29, supra, the dominant firm's output remains constant before and 
after the practice because I have (for simplicity) drawn the dominant firm's marginal cost curve 
MCd so that it intersects the residual marginal revenue curves X'B and X''B at the point (B) 
where they intersect each other. If MCd intersected the marginal revenue curves below B, the 
dominant firm's output would decline; if MCd intersected the marginal revenue curves above B, 
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put; the market's output thus declines and the price rises. 32 But note: 
because the victim's cost savings from reducing its output at least par-
tially offset its increased costs per unit, productive inefficiency may 
increase little, or actually decline. 33 The effect of the predatory prac-
tice on the victim's costs is damaging not because of its effect on the 
firm's costs but because of the effect of the reduction in the firm's sup-
ply elasticity on the predator's monopoly power. 34 
Ill. THE OPTIMAL PENALTY AND THE SCOPE OF LIABILITY 
The forgoing discussion shows the theoretical weaknesses in 
Hovenkamp's notion of WL3 losses. But Hovenkamp does not offer 
WL3 losses as an exercise in pure theory; instead, he suggests that it 
supports a broader definition of compensable harms in antitrust cases. 
He suggests that the optimal deterrence model is inappropriate for the 
analysis of questions of antitrust damages, particularly for exclusion-
ary practices, because it assumes that the optimal penalty is calculated 
and then the right to recover for that amount is assigned to the best 
plaintiff, regardless of which economic actors actually suffered the 
harm. This assumption, he says, is inconsistent with a system of reme-
dies based on damages for individual harms.35 He canvasses the legis-
lative history of the Sherman Act and discovers that Congress 
the dominant firm's output would increase, but by less than the amount that the fringe firm's 
output would decrease. 
Also in the diagram in note 29, supra, I have illustrated the effect of the exclusionary practice 
by rotating the fringe firm's supply curve MC/' to MC/'~ If the practice instead caused a parallel 
upward shift in MCt then the attendant residual demand and marginal revenue curves would 
also shift upward and parallel. In that case, the dominant firm's output would also increase, 
since the firm's marginal cost would necessarily intersect the higher, new marginal revenue curve 
at a higher output. Again, however, the fringe firm's reduction in output would more than erase 
the increase. 
32. Output in the market could increase only if the shift in output from the fringe to the 
dominant firm caused the market price actually to decline. This circumstance would require, 
among other conditions, that the dominant firm's marginal cost decline at a rate greater than the 
firm's new residual demand curve. Such circumstances, resembling natural monopoly, are 
unlikely. 
33. In the diagram in note 29, supra, whether a given reduction in the slope of the fringe 
firm's marginal cost from MC/' to MC/" reduces or increases productive efficiency depends upon 
whether the decrease in the fringe firm's output from Qf' to Qf" is proportionally greater than 
the increase in the amount by which the fringe firm's marginal cost exceeds the dominant firm's 
marginal cost. Specifically, the area of E'F'Pc will be greater than the area of E''F''Pc if Qf'(Pm' 
- Pc) 12 is greater than Qf"(Pm" - Pc) /2. This condition is satisfied if the ratio Qf'/Qf" is 
greater than the ratio (Pm" - Pc)/(Pm' - Pc). 
34. The welfare effects of the exclusionary practice depicted in note 29, supra, are clear. The 
deadweight welfare loss increases by an amount equal to the areaA'B'B''A'~ Even if productive 
inefficiency declines (see supra note 33), the sum of productive and allocative inefficiency 
increases. 
35. Hovenkamp, supra note 1, at 5. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988) (limiting recovery to three 
times the damages sustained by the plaintiff). 
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intended to protect not only consumers (from both deadweight welfare 
losses and wealth transfers to producers) but also competitors of anti-
trust offenders. Competitors are, he concludes, one of antitrust's pro-
tected classes. 
Hovenkamp apparently does not intend by this argument to revive 
the protectionist antitrust perspective of the Warren Court, which, in 
practice if not in words, equated damage to competitors with damage 
to competition. Hovenkamp says in his discussion of legislative his-
tory that "only conduct calculated to create a monopoly is to be con-
demned, "36 and later recognizes that "[n]ot all the losses ... in 
antitrust cases reflect net welfare losses."37 He offers little guidance, 
however, on how courts are to separate WL3 losses from other harms 
factually caused by a properly-defined antitrust offense. 
Hovenkamp's argument raises these concerns because he miscon-
ceives not only the social costs of monopolistic practices, but the rela-
tionship between private harm and the optimal penalty. Hovenkamp 
is correct that the present legal regime does not permit severing the 
penalty from the private harm, 38 although the Illinois Brick39 doctrine 
qualifies this point. One need not, however, on that account, reject the 
optimal deterrence model. As I have argued at length elsewhere, that 
model can guide the application of established doctrines such as anti-
trust injury and standing.40 The antitrust injury doctrine provides a 
first approximation of the optimal penalty by identifying those harms 
that are causally related to the allocative inefficiency associated with 
the offense. The causal connection is shown if the type of harm al-
leged varies in direct proportion to the output restriction.41 The crite-
rion of proportional variation may, however, be overly expansive, 
since the sum of the harms that meet it may exceed the optimal pen-
alty, particularly if the coefficient of proportionality is greater than 
one. Thus, in many cases, a second step is necessary to select the 
36. Hovenkamp, supra note 1, at 27. 
37. Id. at 37. 
38. The penalty could be calculated independently of the harm to the plaintiff. The legal 
system already recognizes a similar device in qui tam actions. See generally Caminker, The Con-
stitutionality of Qui Tam Actions, 99 YALE L.J. 341 (1989). Whether such an approach would be 
preferable to the current regime of private antitrust penalties is a difficult issue, but one we need 
not decide under the current language of§ 4 of the Clayton Act. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988). 
39. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977) (permitting direct purchasers from 
price-fixers to recover, even if part of overcharge passed on). Hovenkamp is dissatisfied with 
Illinois Brick also. See Hovenkamp, The Indirect Purchaser Rule and Cost-Plus Sales, 103 
HARV. L. REV. 1717 (1990). 
40. See sources cited supra note 2; see also Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 
104, 110 n.5 (1986). 
41. See Page, Chicago School, supra note 2, at 1272-73. 
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plaintiffs in the best position to bring suit for an amount equal to the 
optimal penalty.42 This second step is provided by the doctrine of an-
titrust standing. 
Under this approach, harms to competitors should in some in-
stances be compensable. One reason, which Hovenkamp recognizes, is 
that competitors are a reliable and knowledgeable class of antitrust 
plaintiffs. As we saw in Part II, however, competitors' harms are not 
themselves the defining social costs of monopoly. They are antitrust 
injury only if they are proportional to the social cost, the deadweight 
loss from increased monopoly power.43 It is therefore misleading to 
characterize competitors as a protected class; their right to recover for 
their harms is purely instrumental. Nothing in Hovenkamp's survey 
of the legislative history of the Sherman Act contradicts this view of 
the private damage action. 
A relatively clear application of this approach would approve both 
the traditional measure of damages for the overcharge in price-fixing 
cases, and the Illinois Brick doctrine's limitation of the right to recover 
for the overcharge to the first purchaser from the offenders. The over-
charge is proportional to the allocative inefficiency of the offense: both 
are created by the same output restriction. The antitrust injury, so 
defined, directly reflects the largest portion of the optimal penalty, the 
monopoly profit.44 But all purchasers in the chain, direct and indirect, 
suffer antitrust injury in this sense; allowing them all to recover would 
raise a serious risk of duplicate recovery, increased litigation costs, and 
dilution of the incentive to sue. The Illinois Brick45 solution, which 
concentrates the right to recover for the overcharge in the first pur-
chasers, is the prototypical standing rule: it selects the most efficient 
set of plaintiffs to impose the deterrent penalty.46 
A less common case is the problem of defining the right to sue for 
"overcharges" paid to the cartel's competitive fringe.47 As we saw in 
the last part, the fringe_ firms are able to increase their output to the 
42. Page, Scope of Liability, supra note 2, at 1483-98. 
43. The requirement of proportionality is satisfied in the example in supra note 25. Because, 
in that example, the lost rent is equal to the savings in production costs, the lost rent is likewise 
proportional to the increase in allocative inefficiency. 
44. Page, Scope of Liability, supra note 2, at 1465. 
45. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). 
46. Page, Scope of Liability, supra note 2, at 1486-88. Notice that this analysis does not 
depend on recognizing the overcharge as an independent social cost of monopoly; the defining 
social cost is the deadweight welfare loss from the monopolistic output restriction. See supra 
note 17. The overcharge is nonetheless compensable as antitrust injury because it meets the 
standard of proportional variation. 
47. See Hovenkamp, supra note 1, at 31 n.110. 
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point at which their marginal cost equals the cartel's price.48 Do the 
amounts consumers pay to these firms also reflect antitrust injury? 
The antitrust injury and standing analysis resolves this problem in the 
following way.49 Purchasers from the competitive fringe suffer anti-
trust injury, since their harm is causally related to the allocative ineffi-
ciency associated with the cartel: the same output restriction that 
allows the cartel to set the dominant firm price also allows the fringe 
to set its price at that level. 
The standing analysis is less clear-cut, but also permits suit. One 
might argue that the overcharge paid to the fringe is in part a wealth 
transfer that does not reflect the monopoly profit, because it is not 
captured by the cartel; thus, to allow it as damages in addition to the 
overcharge paid to the cartel members themselves would represent 
overdeterrence. But this reasoning ignores two points. First, as we 
have seen,50 the increased output of the fringe carries with it increased 
costs of production for those marginal units, costs that are also social 
costs of dominant firm pricing. Moreover, the overcharge to cartel 
members, by itself, is inevitably less than the optimal penalty, since it 
does not take account of the deadweight welfare loss from the cartel. 
To allow purchasers from the fringe to recover would thus not repre-
sent overdeterrence, or permit duplicative recoveries. It follows, then, 
that those who purchase from the fringe also have antitrust standing. 
This approach also recognizes the right of competitors to sue for 
true exclusionary practices. It does so, however, not because the 
harms to competitors are themselves social costs, but because they are 
causally linked to the monopolistic output restriction, and serve as a 
reasonable proxy for the welfare loss associated with the output re-
striction. Suppose, for example, that the fringe firms in the last exam-
ple are excluded from the market. As we saw in Part II, 51 in these 
circumstances the output restriction in the market corresponds di-
rectly to the reduction in the fringe firms' output; the expected returns 
to the fringe firms on those units of production - represented by the 
going concern value of the firm - should be recognized as antitrust 
injury. Notice that the harm to the excluded firm is not itself an exog-
enous social cost;52 it reflects the allocative inefficiency in the sense of 
48. See supra note 22. 
49. Page, Scope of Liability, supra note 2, at 1465-67, 1490-92; see also In re Arizona Dairy 
Prods. Litig., 627 F. Supp. 233 (D. Ariz. 1985). 
50. See supra note 22. 
51. See supra note 25. 
52. Obviously, if the predator bombs the victim's plant there are additional social costs. 
Hovenkamp views these as antitrust injury. See Hovenkamp, supra note 1, at 20-21. They are 
not, however, since they bear no relationship to the monopolistic effect; they would be the same 
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bearing a direct proportional relationship to it. It is antitrust injury 
because it serves as an appropriate proxy for a portion of the optimal 
penalty. 
This reasoning applies even if the firm is not entirely excluded 
from the market. If the exclusionary practice raises the firm's margi-
nal costs by denying access to inputs, economies of scale, or efficient 
means of distribution, and thereby enhances the offender's monopoly 
power, the expected profits on those lost sales should be recoverable.s3 
This argument casts doubt on Hovenkamp's suggestion that the 
victim's lost investment is a preferable measure of damages in such 
cases. s4 Lost profits are antitrust injury because they are proportional 
to the output restriction that the practice makes possible. It is not 
clear that Hovenkamp's notion of lost investment bears the necessary 
relationship to the extent of the output restriction. ss The lost profits 
represent returns on the very units of production that are excluded 
from the market.s6 None of this denies the problems of proof that the 
lost profits measure raises, but the legal system has well-established 
standards of proof that set limits on the risk of error.s7 
It is crucial, of course, that the exclusion be a true anticompetitive 
regardless of the market conditions. The standard of proportional variation excludes this basis 
for recovery, although the additional damages would be independently actionable. 
53. See supra note 29. The amount must, of course, be reduced by any benefit to the fringe 
from the increased price in the market. The measure would thus be the difference between 
E'Pm 'Pc and E''Pm ''Pc. Notice that if the increased cost to the fringe firm takes the form of a 
parallel upward shift in its MC. the reduction in its rent would be greater since the shift would 
have a greater effect on the costs of intramarginal units of production. 
54. Hovenkamp, supra note 1, at 38-40. 
55. Hovenkamp refers to lost unrecoverable investment. Id. at 40. If by this measure he 
means the reduction in the value of the assets associated with the monopolistic exclusion, then it 
is a measure of lost profits and therefore antitrust injury. Of course, investment may be "lost" 
for a host of reasons unrelated to anticompetitive exclusion. Consequently, use of this measure 
does not eliminate the evidentiary concerns Hovenkamp raises. 
56. Easterbrook has criticized my argument on this point because it appears to allow greater 
damages to the plaintiff in circumstances in which the market conditions before the predation 
were least competitive. Easterbrook, supra note 8, at 326-27. Where the market, for example, is 
shared oligopolistically between two firms, the damages for exclusion of one of them would be 
greater than if the market were competitive before the exclusion. This point illustrates the im· 
portance of the theoretical frame for the question. In my view, by far the more plausible market 
condition before predation is dominant firm pricing. Both of Easterbrook's hypothetical cases 
require that the victim have a market share comparable to that of the predator, an unlikely 
circumstance. 
57. Hovenkamp correctly points out that lost accounting profits may include opportunity 
costs, the return on investment in its best alternative use. Hovenkamp, supra note 1, at 40. The 
requirement of mitigation of damages imposes some limitations on this difficulty. See generally 
Hamilton & Cone, Mitigation of Antitrust Damages, 66 OR. L. REV. 339 (1987). On the question 
of speculativeness of damages, see Bell v. Dow Chem. Co., 847 F.2d 1179, 1183-84 (5th Cir. 
1988) (rejecting potential entrant's claim for lost profits as speculative); McGlinchy v. Shell 
Chem. Co., 845 F.2d 802, 806-07 (9th Cir. 1988) (rejecting expert testimony concerning lost 
profits). 
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exclusion, not the simple displacement of the output of one firm by the 
output of another. Competition itself excludes firms from some share 
of the market. The Supreme Court made clear in Brunswick58 and 
Cargi/l59 that firms do not suffer antitrust injury when they suffer lost 
profits because an allegedly unlawful merger of their competitors en-
hances competition. And last term, in Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA 
Petroleum Co., 60 the Court extended the principle to deny antitrust 
injury to competitors of firms whose prices were lowered by a maxi-
mum resale price-fixing agreement. For the same reasons, profits on 
sales lost because of a competitor's exclusive dealing arrangements or 
tying arrangements61 are not antitrust injury if they reflect merely a 
substitution of one firm's output for another. In all such cases, the 
plaintiff should be required to demonstrate that the harm is linked to 
an output restriction in the market. 62 
Less obviously, harm from predatory pricing during the predatory 
campaign should not be treated as antitrust injury. Hovenkamp ap-
pears to accept the traditional view that lost profits on sales made dur-
ing a predatory campaign are compensable. 63 But, as we saw in the 
last section, those lost profits are mere wealth transfers to consumers. 
Moreover, they are not necessarily proportional to any inefficiency as-
sociated with predatory pricing; indeed, the victim may reduce its out-
put or shut down entirely until the campaign ends. The only real 
social cost of the practice is borne by the predator. Only if the victim 
of predatory pricing is actually excluded is there a social cost that 
would justify recognizing a right of the victim to recover. 
Hovenkamp's failure to distinguish increased costs from reduced 
revenues indicates the pitfalls of a concept as vague as WL3 losses. 
Antitrust plaintiffs are likely to use the antitrust laws for rent-seeking, 
to suppress vigorous competition. As the Court observed in Atlantic 
Richfield, "a competitor will be injured and hence motivated to sue 
only when a vertical, maximum price-fixing arrangement has a 
procompetitive impact on the market."64 To mitigate this danger, the 
58. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-0-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977). 
59. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986). 
60. 110 s. Ct. 1884 (1990). 
61. See, e.g., Metrix Warehouse, Inc. v. Daimler-Benz, A.G., 828 F.2d 1033, 1042-43 (4th 
Cir. 1987) (evidence that sales pursuant to tying arrangement were in part due to procompetitive 
act of defendant contradicted plaintiff's "yardstick" measure of lost profits). 
62. See Page, Scope of Liability, supra note 2, at 1479-82. 
63. Hovenkamp, supra note 1, at 32-33; see also Atlantic Richfield, 110 S. Ct. at 1892 & n.10 
and passim (maximum resale prices at issue were "non-predatory"); Blair & Harrison, Rethink-
ing Antitrust Injury, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1539, 1561-65 (1989) (unsuccessful predatory pricing 
causes antitrust injury to competitors). 
64. 110 S. Ct. at 1895 (emphasis in original). 
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doctrine of antitrust injury requires plaintiffs to offer a clear account of 
the causal relationship between their harm and the only true indicator 
of monopolistic behavior, the output restriction. By liberating plain-
tiffs from this requirement, Hovenkamp's WL3 losses would under-
mine the function of the antitrust injury doctrine. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Hovenkamp has provided a useful opportunity to consider the re-
lationships among social cost, competitive harm, and antitrust injury. 
His general points - that we must work within a system of remedies 
based upon individual harms and that competitors are sometimes the 
best enforcers in such a system - are correct. Unfortunately, his idea 
of WL3 losses is an insufficient basis for analysis and should be re-
jected. A properly interpreted doctrine of antitrust injury and stand-
ing should rely on convincing theoretical links between the private 
harm alleged and the monopolistic output restriction. 
